In this paper, we propose an approach for weaving security concerns in the Gimple representation of programs. Gimple is an intermediate, language-independent, and tree-based representation generated by GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) during the compilation process. This proposition constitutes the first attempt towards adopting the aspect-oriented concept on Gimple and exploiting this intermediate representation to allow advising an application written in a specific language with security code written in a different one. At the same time, injecting security is applied in a systematic way in order not to alter the original functionalities of the software. We explore the viability and the relevance of our proposition by: (1) implementing several Gimple weaving capabilities into the GCC compiler (2) developing a case study for securing the connections of a client application and (3) using the weaving features of the extended GCC to inject the security concerns into the application.
INTRODUCTION
Security is taking an increasingly predominant role in today's computing world. The industry is facing challenges in public confidence at the discovery of vulnerabilities, and customers are expecting security to be delivered out of the box, even on programs that have not been designed with security in mind. The challenge is even greater when legacy systems must be adapted to networked/web environments, while they are not originally designed to fit into such high-risk environments. As a result, integrating security into software becomes a very challenging and interesting domain of research.
On the other hand, securing software is a difficult and a critical procedure. If it is applied manually, it requires high security expertise and lot of time to be tackled. It may also create other vulnerabilities. One way of addressing such problems is by separating out the security concerns from the rest of the application, such that they can be addressed independently and applied globally. More recently, several proposals have been advanced for code injection, via an aspect-oriented computational style, into source code for the purpose of improving its security (Bodkin, 2004; DeWin, 2004; Huang et al., 2004; Shah, 2003) . Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is an appealing approach that allows the separation of crosscutting concerns. This paradigm seems to be very promising to integrate security into software. The process of merging the security concerns into the original program is called weaving. In this context, we have presented previously in (Mourad et al., 2007; Mourad et al., 2008) contributions towards elaborating methodologies and solutions to integrate systematically and consistently security models and components into software.
In this paper, we have built on top of them and introduced an AOP weaving approach for injecting security concerns in the Gimple representation of programs. Gimple is an intermediate, languageindependent, and tree-based representation generated by GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) during the com-pilation process. Our new proposition constitutes of developing AOP weaving capabilities for Gimple to be integrated into the GCC compiler. These features allow to compile security concerns and inject them into the Gimple tree of a program during the GCC compilation procedures. Beside, this approach is the first attempt towards adopting the aspect-oriented concept on Gimple and exploiting this intermediate representation to allow advising an application written in a specific language with security code written in a different one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the contributions in the field of AOP and AOP for securing software. Afterwards, in Section 3, we describe the new approach where weaving is performed on the Gimple representation of a software by adopting the aspect-oriented style. In Section 4, we present the experimental results of developing a case study for securing the connections of a client application and using the weaving features implemented in the extended GCC for injecting the required security concerns. Finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The proposed approach is based on AOP and target security concerns. As such, we present in the sequel a brief summary on AOP and an overview on the approaches related to the contribution of this paper.
Aspect-oriented Programming
AOP depends on the principle of "Separation of Concerns", where issues that crosscut the application are addressed separately and encapsulated within aspects. There are many AOP languages that have been developed which are programming language-dependent. AspectJ (Kiczales et al., 2001 ) built on top of the Java programming language and AspectC++ (Spinczyk et al., 2002) built on top of the C++ programming language are the most prominent ones. The approach, which is adopted by most of the AOP languages, is called the pointcut-advice model. The fundamental concepts of this model are: join points, pointcuts, and advices. Each atomic unit of code to be injected is called an advice. It is necessary to formulate where to inject the advice into the program. This is done by the use of a pointcut expression, which its matching criteria restricts the set of the join points of a program for which the advice will be injected. A join point is a principled point in the execution of a program. At the heart of this model, is the concept of an aspect, which embodies all these elements. Finally, the aspect is composed and merged with the core functionality modules into one single program. This process of merging and composition is called weaving, and the tools that perform such process are called weavers.
AOP Approaches for Security Injection
Most of the contributions (Bodkin, 2004; DeWin, 2004; Huang et al., 2004; Shah, 2003) that explore the usability of AOP for integrating security code into applications are presented as case studies that show the relevance of AOP languages for application security. They have focused on exploring the usefulness of AOP for securing software by security experts who know exactly where each piece of code should be manually injected. None of them have proposed an approach or methodology for systematic security hardening with features similar to our proposition. We present in the following an overview on these contributions. Cigital labs has proposed an AOP language called CSAW (Shah, 2003) , which is a small superset of C programming language dedicated to improve the security of C programs. De Win, in his Ph.D. thesis (DeWin, 2004) , has discussed an aspect-oriented approach that allows the integration of security aspects within applications. It uses AOP concepts to specify the behavior code to be merged in the application and the location where this code should be injected. In (Bodkin, 2004) , Ron Bodkin has surveyed the security requirements for enterprise applications and described examples of security crosscutting concerns, with a focus on authentication and authorization. Another contribution in AOP security is the Java Security Aspect Library (JSAL), in which Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2004) has introduced and implemented, in AspectJ, a reusable and generic aspect library that provides security functions. Masuhara and Kawauchi (Masuhara and Kawauchi, 2003) have defined the dataflow pointcut, which identifies join points based on the origin of values.
WEAVING METHODOLOGY
The initial proposition, which is detailed in (Mourad et al., 2007; Mourad et al., 2008) , is composed of a framework, a language called SHL and a compiler for securing software in a systematic way. SHL is an aspect-oriented and programming-independent language. According to the proposed methodology, the resulting component, which is written in SHL, is a programming-language independent aspect (also known as pattern) for security hardening. Consequently, this pattern should be refined into code level aspect before passing it to the corresponding AOP weaver (e.g. AspectJ, AspectC++), which is then launched to weave it with the original code.
TOWARDS LANGUAGE-INDEPENDENT APPROACH FOR SECURITY CONCERNS WEAVING
In this paper, we have extended this approach and built on top of it, by taking the resulting programming-language independent aspect (i.e. pattern) described using SHL and weaving its components directly in the Gimple representation (i.e. Gimple Tree) of a program. This allows to bypass the refinement of the pattern into programming-language dependent aspect, and consequently not using the current AOP weavers. Beside, it exploits the Gimple intermediate representation to advise an application written in a specific programming language with code written in a different one. The approach architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The methodology constitutes of passing the SHL security pattern and the original software to an extended version of the GCC compiler, which generates the executable of the trusted software. An additional pass has been added to GCC in order to interrupt the compilation once the Gimple representation of the code is completed. This pass can be called by selecting an option when performing the compilation (e.g. gcc -Weaving SecureConnectionPattern.shl -c Connection.c ...). In parallel, as temporary solutions, the components of the security pattern are translated into special format file. Additional components have been developed in order to parse such file, gather the needed information (e.g. function name, return type, etc.) and pass them as parameters to specific functions provided by GCC and responsible of building Gimple trees (e.g. build_decl(...)). Afterwards, the generated security trees are integrated in the tree of the original code (also using functions provided by GCC for this purposes) with respect to the location(s) specified into the pattern. Finally, the resulted Gimple tree is passed again to GCC in order to continue the regular compilation process and produce the executable of the secure software. The added features were originally implemented by our colleagues (Yang, 2007) in order to insert code for monitoring. We have modified it in order to inject security functionalities. The work on the implementation of the weaving features is still in progress.
CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a case study for securing the connections of client applications. To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposition , we have elaborated first, using SHL, the language-independent security aspect (i.e. pattern) needed to secure the connections of a selected client application. Then, we have refined the pattern into AspectC++ aspect and weaved it into the selected application. Afterwards, we have repeated this process using our new proposition, where we have compiled directly the same application and the translated file of the pattern using the extended GCC and applied the weaving on the Gimple representation of the application.
Pattern and Aspect for Securing the Connections of Client Application
We have selected a client application implemented in C++, which allows to connect and exchange data with a server through HTTP requests. Listing 1 presents the pattern elaborated in SHL for securing the connection of the aforementioned application using GnuTL-S/SSL (Please refer to (Mourad et al., 2007; Mourad et al., 2008) for SHL structure and syntax). The code of the functions used in the Code of the pattern's Behavior(s) is illustrated in Listing 2. It is expressed in C++ because the application is implemented in this programming language. However, other syntax and programming languages can also be used depending on the abstraction required and the implementation language of the application to harden. To generalize our solution and make it applicable on wider range of applications, we assume that not all the connections are secured, since many programs have different local interprocess communications via sockets. In this case, all the functions responsible of sending/receiving data on the secure channels are replaced by the ones provided by TLS. On the other hand, the other functions that operate on the non-secure channels are kept untouched. Moreover, we suppose that the connection processes and the functions that send and receive data are implemented in different components.
We have refined and implemented (using AspectC++) in Listing 3 the corresponding aspect of the pattern that is presented in Listing 1. The reader will notice the appearance of hardening_sockinfo_t. These are the data structures and functions that we have developed to distinguish between secure and non secure channels. Besides, they are used to export the parameters between the application's components at runtime. In order to avoid using shared memory directly, we have opted for a hash table that uses the socket number as a key to store and retrieve all the needed information (in our own defined data structure). One additional information that we have stored is whether the socket is secure or not. In this manner, all calls to a send() and recv() are modified for a runtime check that uses the proper sending/receiving function.
Listing 1: SHL Pattern for Securing Connection.
BeginPattern Before

E x e c u t i o n <main> / / S t a r t i n g P o i n t BeginBehavior / / I n i t i a l i z e t h e TLS l i b r a r y I n i t i a l i z e T L S L i b r a r y ; EndBehavior
Before
C a l l <c o n n e c t > / / TCP C o n n e c t i o n ExportParameter <x c r e d > ExportParameter < s e s s i o n > BeginBehavior / / I n i t i a l i z e t h e TLS s e s s i o n r e s o u r c e s I n i t i a l i z e T L S S e s s i o n ; EndBehavior After
C a l l <c o n n e c t > ImportParameter < s e s s i o n > BeginBehavior / / Add t h e TLS h a n d s h a k e AddTLSHandshake ; EndBehavior Replace
C a l l <send > ImportParameter < s e s s i o n > BeginBehavior / / Change t h e s e n d f u n c t i o n s u s i n g t h a t / / s o c k e t by t h e TLS s e n d f u n c t i o n s o f t h e / / u s e d API when u s i n g a s e c u r e d s o c k e t SSLSend ; EndBehavior Replace
C a l l < r e c e i v e > ImportParameter < s e s s i o n > BeginBehavior / / Change t h e r e c e i v e f u n c t i o n s u s i n g t h a t / / s o c k e t by t h e TLS r e c e i v e f u n c t i o n s o f / / t h e u s e d API when u s i n g a s e c u r e d s o c k e t S S L R e c e i v e ; EndBehavior Before
C a l l < c l o s e > / / S o c k e t c l o s e ImportParameter <x c r e d > ImportParameter < s e s s i o n > BeginBehavior / / Cut t h e TLS c o n n e c t i o n C l o s e A n d D e a l o c a t e T L S S e s s i o n ; EndBehavior After
E x e c u t i o n <main > BeginBehavior / / D e i n i t i a l i z e t h e TLS l i b r a r y D e i n i t i a l i z e T L S L i b r a r y ; EndBehavior EndPattern
Listing 2: Functions Used in Secure Connection Pattern. 
Experimental Results
In order to verify the hardening correctness, we have set first in the original application the server port number to 443, which means the client and the server can only communicate through HTTPS (ssl-mode). Any communication through http won't be understood and will fail. Then, we have compiled and run the client application and made it connect to the server (www.encs.concordia.ca) to retrieve information. The experimental results in Figure 2 show that the application failed to retrieve successfully the information. The server replies with a bad request because it is not able to understand the message content (Please see the run in the terminal). The highlighted lines in the Wireshark capture of the traffic show that the communication fails and stops after exchanging few undetermined messages.
Afterwards, we have weaved (using AspectC++ weaver) the elaborated aspect in Listing 3 with the different variants of the original application and compiled the resulting source code (using g++) to generate its corresponding executable.
Then, we have compiled the same original application using the extended GCC. Integrating the security concerns in the Gimple representation of code does not require refining the pattern into aspect. Compiling the selected client application by specifying the weaving option and selecting the file, which its contents are extracted manually (temporary solution) from the pattern for securing connection in Listing 1, is enough to perform the injection of the security concerns and generate the executable of the secured ap- plication.
Running the two generated executables gave exactly the same results on the terminals and in the Wireshark packet captures. Due to this and to avoid duplication, we present in Figure 3 only the run of the application hardened by the Gimple weaving capabilities. The experimental results (Please see the run in the terminal and the highlighted lines in the Wireshark capture) explore that the new secure application is able to connect using both HTTP and HTTPS connections and exchange successfully the data from the server in ssl-mode and encrypted form, exploring the correctness of the security integration process and the feasibility of our propositions.
CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced in this paper an AOP weaving approach for injecting security concerns in the Gimple representation of programs. This proposition constitutes the first attempt towards adopting the aspectoriented concept on Gimple and exploiting this intermediate representation to allow advising an application written in a specific language with security code written in a different one. In this context, few AOP weaving capabilities for Gimple have been developed and integrated into the GCC compiler. These features allow to weave security concerns in the Gimple tree of a program during the GCC compilation procedures. We have also explored the feasibility and the relevance of our propositions into practical implementation and a case study for securing an application using the proposed weaving capabilities.
